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The common law 




S ir Edward Coke (1552 1634) was the greatest lawyer of his age. Having been Elizabeth I's J o o Attorney-General, he became Chief Justice, first of
the Common Pleas in 1606, and then of the King's Bench' o
in 1612. He held this post until his dismissal lour years 
later in the aftermath of his notorious clash with Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere over equity's jurisdiction to stay 
executions of common law judgments. In the following 
decade, he played a prominent role in Parliament, notably 
in the debates leading to the Petition of Right in 1628. 
Having published the first eleven volumes of his Reports 
before leaving the bench, he later turned to writing the
O ' O
four volumes of his Institutes, the first part of which   
known as Coke upon Littleton — was published in 1628, and 
the other three parts posthumously, in 1642 1644.
INFLUENTIAL WRITINGS
Coke's writings remained hugely influential, notably on 
Hale and Blackstone. Many generations of lawyers 
continued to be raised on Coke upon Littleton. It was the 
first law book used by Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. 
As late as 1831, Francis Hobler, seeking to improve legal 
education for the lower branch of the profession, 
published some Familiar Exercises between an attorney and his 
articled clerk, which took the form of Coke's book reduced 
to questions. Coke remains protoundly important for our 
understanding of the roots and nature of common lawo
thinking. Yet in many ways, he is far from easy to 
understand, and there has been continuing debate, from 
the publication of JGA. Pocock's The Ancient Constitution 
and the Feudal Law in 1957 to JW Tubbs's The Common Law 
Mind in 2000 over what Coke's vision, and that of 
seventeenth century common lawyers, was.
In Pocock's view, the common lawyers believed their law 
was essentially customary. For example, Sir John Davies 
(1569 1626), Attorney-General for Ireland, described it 
in the preface to his Irish Reports (1612) as 'nothing else 
but the Common Custome of the Realm' which was 
'recorded and registred no-where but in the memory of 
the people.' Equally, it is argued, they lelt the law was 
immemorial and unchanging. Thus, in the prelaces to his 
Reports, Coke sought to prove that particular institutions
or legal rules had existed in the same form prior to the o r
conquest, and to argue that where, in the past, the ancient 
common law had been diverted from its true course, it 
had over time been restored again to its purity.
Yet, as Pocock pointed out, this vision seems 
paradoxical. A customary legal system implies change and 
development. Sir Matthew Hale (1609 76) realised this, 
when he compared the common law with the growing 
body of a man, which could change while remaining 
essentially the same. By contrast, Coke's vision of history, 
in part inspired by that of Sir John Fortescue 
(c!395 c!477), seems crudely static. Historians have 
sought to resolve this paradox by arguing that Coke's 
vision of history is either unimportant to his 
jurisprudence or unrepresentative of common lawyers. 
However, it may be equally suggested that the paradox can 
be resolved, that Coke could at the same time 
acknowledge the dynamic nature of legal development, 
while retaining a view of the fundamental principles of law 
which stressed its timeless nature.
SHAPED BY PRACTICE
Coke's vision of the law was profoundly shaped by 
practice. It is notable that he did not set out to write a 
principled summary of the nature ol the law, in the 
manner of Bracton or Blackstone's Commentaries. Indeed, in 
the preface to the third volume of his Reports, he dismissed 
attempts to methodise the common law, commenting that 
they profited the authors, but 'have brought no small 
prejudice to others.' It was only once he was removed 
from court that Coke turned to write his own Institutes, as 
a kind of pis aller. For Coke, the report was the preferable 
type of legal literature, for it 'doth set open the windows 
of the law to let in that gladsome light whereby the right 
reason of the rule (the beauty of the law) may be clearly 
discerned' (9 Co. Rep. preface).
It was not that the lawyers felt that there were no clear 
principles of the common law. Indeed, Davies said they 
were 'fixed and certain'. However, lawyers saw little need 
to set them down, in part because they had already been 
recorded in the past. Thus, Coke described Sir Thomas
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Littleton's Tenures of 1481, which formed the basis of his 
commentary in Coke upon Littleton, as 'the most perfect and 
absolute work that was ever written in any humane 
science'. If the key rules of land law had been digested by 
this judge, it was not for Coke to duplicate. Elsewhere, he 
seemed to take the view that the fundamentals of Englisho
law were to be found in medieval statutes such as Magna 
Carta and the Statute of Merton, as well as the original 
writs in the Register. These sources, he said, 'are the very 
Body, & as it were the very Text of the common Laws of 
England.' By contrast, the Year Books and Records were 
'but Commentaries and Expositions of those laws' (8 Co. 
Rep. preface).
Yet these principles alone were inadequate for the 
lawyer. Explaining his decision to publish reports, Coke 
argued that 'the law is not uncertain in abstracto but in 
concrete' (9 Co. Rep. preface). Errors were often made by 
lawyers who reasoned badly. Davies similarly said that the 
greatest difficulty came not from the principles of law, but 
from their application to human actions, which were 
constantly in flux. Reports were thus a way of exploring 
the application of the lawr in the concrete situations of a 
case, in a manner to clarify and correct errors brought 
about by the weak reasoning of other men. It is in the 
context of this ambition that we should read one of Coke's 
most famous statements, that (Coke upon Littleton, 97b):
'reason is the life of the Law, nay the common law itself is 
nothing else but reason, which is to be understood of an Artificial 
perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and 
experience, and not of every man's natural reason'.
Coke's concept of artificial reason was, ol course, a 
useful defence of the common lawyers' control of the law 
against the claims of King James I that if the law were 
nothing but reason, then he could in his royal capacity 
decide cases, since he 'had reason, as well as the Judges' 
(12 Co. Rep. 63 65). But it was more than that. For Coke 
said that 'no man alone with all his true and uttermost 
labours, nor all the actors in them themselves by 
themselves out of a Court of Justice, nor in Court without 
solemne argument' could ever come to the right reason of 
a rule. His point was that the common law needed to be 
found and applied through the very procedure of 
argument in court (9 Co. Rep. preface).
SOURCES OF COMMON LAW
In arguing in court, what were the sources of the 
common law for Coke? For Bracton and Blackstone, the 
law of nature and custom were the two principal sources 
of the common law. The law of nature, however, was not a 
directly important source of laws for early modern writers. 
It was generally treated as a founding principle of the law, 
but not as a practically applicable one. Sir John Fortescue, 
the first Englishman to write a treatise on natural law, thuso '
compared the law of nature (which he also called the law 
divine) with the sun, which gives light and life to the
planets. However, in his view, one would never understand 
the planets by merely studying the sun. Arguing from this 
analogy to the laws, Fortescue stated:
'so also all laws of men acquire their Jorce by influence of the 
law Dirine ... and yet they who are skilled, however profoundly, 
in the knowledge of the Divine law cannot, without the study of 
human laws, be learned in human laws' (De Natura Legis 
Naturae i 43).
Similarly, positive human law played a crucial part in the 
vision of Christopher St German (c. 1460 1541). In his 
Doctor and Student (1528 30), he stated that while some 
laws were directly related to reason (such as the rule 
against killing), the larger body of the law (such as the 
rules of property) involved applying the law of reason 
secondary particular, which was based on customs, 
maxims and statutes.
NATURAL LAW
For most common lawyers, natural law was only to be 
applied directly when the common law was silent. Thus, 
Sir John Dodderidge (1555 1628) stated that when new 
matter was considered, 'we do as the Sorbonists and 
Civilians' resort to natural law, as the ground of all laws,' o '
and draw from it that which was best for the 
commonwealth. Coke himself cited natural law as a basis 
of argument in Calvin's Case in 1608 (7 Co. Rep. 13), 
stating that it was the eternal law infused into the heart of 
man at the time of his creation, and declaring that it 
existed before any municipal or judicial laws. However, 
Coke was using the principle to answer a question for 
which there was no clear solution in the common law: 
whether a subject of the king of Scotland, born in Scotland 
after James VI's accession to the throne of England, was an 
alien in England.
CUSTOM
At first glance, custom seems a more important source 
of law. St German talked of general customs as a source of 
law, customs which had been approved by the king and his 
progenitors and all their subjects. Yet St German, in 
common with all legal commentators of the age,o o '
distinguished clearly between local customs and general 
ones. The existence of a general custom was a matter to be 
decided by the judges, as a matter of law, whereas the 
existence of local customs was a matter of fact to be 
decided by juries. Coke similarly kept clear the distinction 
between 'Customs reasonable,' and the common law. The 
distinction is found again in a speech by Thomas Hedley 
in the House of Commons in 1610. Hedley said that 
customs were confined to particular places, were triable 
by the jury, and were tested for their reasonableness or 
unreasonableness by the judges. By contrast, the common 
law was 'extended by equity, that whatsoever falleth under 
the same reason will be found the same law.' Hedley stated 
that the common law did not have any custom for its 19
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immediate cause, 'but many other secondary reasons 
which be necessary consequence upon other rules and 
cases in law'. Ultimately, however, they could be traced 
back to 'some primitive maxim, depending immediately 
upon some prescription or custom.'
According to this view, which was shared by Coke, the 
ultimate origin of all law was customary, but it had been 
expanded and developed by the judges, when applied to 
new cases and new situations. It wras at most a very distant 
source of law. When Coke discussed the sources of law 
which the practitioner would have to use, then, he 
referred primarily to forms of reasoning, or to conclusions 
derived by legal argument. Coke noted that Littleton's 
proofs of common law were taken from twenty different 
fountains. The first fountain was 'the maximes, principes, 
rules, intendment and reason of the common law.' Coke 
then went on to list such sources as the books or law, or 
writs in the Register, arguments from approved precedents, 
the common opinion of the sages of the law, arguments ab 
inconvenient! or ab impossibilii and so on. In this set of 
sources, the most important were maxims, which were 
postulates of the common law ultimately derived from 
custom. Glossing Littleton's phrase that it was a maxim in 
law that inheritance may lineally descend but not ascend, 
Coke observed that what was here called a maxim could 
interchangeably be called a principle, axiom or a rule.
MAXIMS
Maxims were of crucial importance to the early modern 
lawyer, finding their earliest discussion in Fortescue. St 
German had called them 'divers principles' which had 
always been 'taken for law in this realm.' As with general 
customs, they were determined by judges rather than 
juries, but where general customs were known throughout 
the realm, St German argued that maxims were only 
known in the king's courts and among those learned in law. 
This distinction between the conclusions of reason derived 
from general custom, known to all, and those axiomso ' '
'peculiarly known, for the most part, to such only as 
profess the study & speculation of laws' was echoed by Sir 
John Dodderidge (Lawyer's Light, p. 45). In practice, the 
distinction was hard to maintain, for it depended on what 
legal principles were widely known, a matter on which 
commentators might disagree. Thus, Littleton's principle 
that lands could never ascend but only descend was treated 
by Coke as a maxim, but by St German as a general custom. 
In either event, the legal status of the rule depended not on 
popular usage but on legal decision. Perhaps aware of this 
problem, Coke himself did not make the same distinction 
of general customs and maxims, but instead minimised the 
importance of the former. For Coke, 'the maine triangles 
of the lawes of England"1 were 'common law, statute law; and 
custome.' While the latter had to be proved to have been 
in continual usage without interruption from time out of 
mind, the common law 'appeareth in our books and 
judicial records' (Coke upon Littleton 1 Ib, 1 lOb). In his view,
the use of maxims and other forms of legal reasoning 
allowed the law to adapt itself to new situations, allowing a 
fluid development of the law.
It should be noted that even in the prefaces to his 
Reports, Coke did not have a wholly static view of the 
common law. In the eighth volume, he stated 'That theO '
grounds of our common laws at this day were beyond the 
memorie or register of any beginning', implying that the 
origins were immemorial, not that the whole content was 
unchanging. In the tenth volume, he stated that new writs 
were added by parliament in the middle ages to the Register 
'in cases newly happening', and elsewhere he approved of 
reforms where needed. Coke was very keen to prove, not 
the timeless existence of every rule, but the immemorial 
origins of the fundamentals of the common law   notably, 
the institutions and the rules of property which had no 
other statutory source. He therefore laid stress 
particularly on the ancient existence of common law 
institutions: sheriffs, jury trial, the courts. He sought to 
show that they were timeless in order to confirm that they 
were ultimately customary in origin. This was hardly a new 
point. When, in St German's Doctor and Student, the 
student was asked to reveal some of the general customs ofo
the kingdom, his first reply was that 'the custom of the 
realm is the very ground of divers courts'. The student's 
next set of examples turned on basic principles of land law, 
such as primogeniture. The key point was that 'there is no 
statute or other written law that treateth of the beginning 
of die said customs of English law ... the old custom of the 
realm is the only and sufficient authority' for them (Doctor 
and Student, p. 57). The point that law was ultimately 
customary   that it owed its authority to immemorial 
custom   was particularly important for Coke, for if it 
could be shown that a time existed when the custom did 
not pertain, the authority of the law, and the lawyers' 
control over it, would be undermined. Given Coke's 
determination to ensure that the common law remained 
the preserve of the common lawyers, this was something 
which had to be avoided.
AUTONOMY OF THE LAW
Coke's concern with the autonomy of the law can be 
seen in one of his most famous judgments, Dr Bonham's 
Case, where he stated (8 Co. Rep. 118a):
'when an Act of Parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common 
law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void'.
This case has been the subject of fierce debate for many 
years, with scholars disagreeing over whether Coke merely 
meant that such statutes should be strictly construed, or 
whether he had in mind a power of judicial review, 
whereby the courts could control parliament. The 
question at issue was whether the College of Physicians 
could fine and cause to be gaoled a physician who 
practised without being admitted by the college; in effect
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acting as judges in their own cause. This was not the only 
case where a judge stated that a statute giving a man power 
to be judge in his own cause would be void; in Day v 
Savadge (Hobart 85) Hobart CJ stated that such a statute 
'made against natural equity ... is void in itself, for jura 
naturae sunt immutabilia and they are leges legum\
It may be suggested that in Bonham, Coke was neither 
seeking to subject all statutes to a potentially expansive 
judicial review, nor was he simply looking towards judicial 
construction of statutes. Rather, he may have had in mind 
that there were constitutional boundaries which 
parliament could not cross. At one level, Coke appears a 
champion of parliamentary sovereignty, at one point 
calling it 'so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot beo '
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds' 
(4 Institutes, 32). Yet he did set bounds to what parliament 
could do. For instance, it was a maxim of the law of 
parliament that no parliament could bind its successor. 
Equally, 'No Act can bind the King from any prerogative 
which is sole and inseparable to his person, but that he 
may dispense with it by a non obstante' (12 Co. Rep. 18). 
There were clear constitutional rules about the status of 
the king, and the status of parliament. Did this extend to 
the courts? Coke was clear that the courts did not derive
their authority' from parliament: hence parliament could 
not impede them. By this view, the common law courts 
were not to be set above parliament to test and control its 
legislation, but they were to be protected from being 
undermined. We may wonder, il this is true, why Coke 
used the phrase 'common right and reason', and why 
Hobart referred to the law of nature, rather than 
articulating a constitutional view referring directly to the
O O y
courts' customary autonomy. One answer to this may be 
that there were dangers in resting too much on the 
customary or chronological origins of the common law's 
authority. Not only was the history less than convincing, 
but even Coke proved inconsistent. Thus, where in the 
Reports he had sought to show that the common law courts 
existed before the time of Arthur, in the Institutes he said 
that they derived their authority from the king. If he 
sought to defend the position of the common lawyers, and 
their control of the law, Coke did not in the end want 
others to look too deeply at the original basis of its 
authority. @
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The International Criminal 
Court: complementarity 
with national criminal 
jurisdiction
by Jimmy Gurule, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School
The 1998 Rome Statute established an International Criminal Court. 
Is its jurisdiction truly complementary to the national criminal 
jurisdictions?
I n an historic event, on 17 July 1998, at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court held in Rome, Italy, the Statute Creating the 
International Criminal Court (the 'Rome Statute') was 
adopted by 120 nations and opened for signature.
While the US generally supports the creation of a 
permanent International Criminal Court (the TCC'), it 
opposes such a court as set forth in the 1998 Rome 
Statute, as it leaves open the potential for US military 
personnel and government officials to be prosecuted 
before the ICC for the unintended and accidental killingo 21
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